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 OPINION OF THE COURT 




WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
 In this breach of contract, unfair competition, and 
Lanham Act case, we determine that venue does not lie in a 
district where the individual defendant did not conduct his 
business and did not carry out any infringing activities.  
Therefore, a default judgment will be vacated, and the case will 
be transferred to the district where the defendant resides and 
carries on his business.  Even though the individual defendant's 
wholly owned corporation, a co-defendant, may have waived an 
objection to venue by failing to have an attorney appear on its 
behalf, we will nevertheless vacate the judgment against the 
company as well so that the entire action may be transferred to 
the same district.  
 Plaintiff Cottman Transmission Systems, Inc. is a 
nationwide franchisor incorporated under the laws of Pennsylvania 
and maintains its principal place of business in that state.  
Cottman licenses the use of its trademark in connection with the 
operation of transmission repair facilities throughout the United 
States.  Defendant Leonardo Martino is a Michigan resident and 
the sole stockholder of co-defendant Trans One II, Inc., a 
Michigan corporation that operates a transmission repair business 
in that state.   
 
 
 In 1988, Martino entered into a franchise agreement 
with A-1 Transmissions, Inc., also a Michigan corporation.  Three 
years later, A-1 assigned its franchises to Cottman.  In 
conformance with that assignment, Martino and Trans One executed 
a franchise agreement with Cottman on August 26, 1991.  However, 
Cottman still asserted an ability to enforce the original A-1 
agreement if necessary. 
 After some months of operation under the newly formed 
franchise, Cottman became dissatisfied with Martino's 
performance, particularly because of inaccurate reporting of 
sales and delinquent license fee payments.  On March 4, 1992, 
Cottman filed suit against Martino and Trans One in the Court of 
Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, alleging fraud 
and breach of the Cottman franchise agreement.  Venue and 
jurisdiction in Montgomery County were established by a forum 
selection clause in the Cottman agreement, and judgment was 
entered against defendants by default. 
 Because the Cottman agreement signed by Martino and 
others failed to comply with a provision of a Michigan statute, 
Cottman offered its franchisees in April 1992 the opportunity to 
rescind their contracts.  Martino asserts that he accepted that 
offer on April 8, 1992.  Cottman disputes the date of 
termination, but concedes that by May, the Cottman-Martino 
agreement was no longer in effect.  In the spring of 1992, 
 
 
Martino and Trans One instituted suits against Cottman in the 
Michigan state courts. 
 On December 17, 1992, Cottman filed the present suit 
against Martino and Trans One in the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, asserting three causes 
of action: 
 (1) a violation of the Lanham Act by the defendants' 
unauthorized use of Cottman's trademarks after "Spring, 1992";  
 (2) breach of the A-1 franchise agreement's covenant  
not to compete; and  
 (3) unfair competition in the operation of a new 
transmission repair center in Michigan under the name of "U.S.A. 
Transmissions," which Martino and Trans One had formed in April 
1992. 
 The Martino litigation was consolidated with several 
other suits previously brought by Cottman in the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania against a number of its former Michigan 
franchisees.  Martino, appearing pro se, challenged personal and 
subject matter jurisdiction as well as venue in that district.  
Trans One did not retain an attorney and, consequently, filed no 
pleadings recognized by the district court.  The district court, 
citing its earlier opinion in the cases against the Cottman 
franchisees, Cottman Transmission Sys., Inc. v. Metro Distrib., 




 In the Metro case, the court cited the forum selection 
clause in the Cottman franchise agreement and rejected the 
defendants' objections to venue.  As further support for its 
ruling, the district court referred to transactions between the 
parties such as payments made by the Michigan franchisees to 
Cottman in Pennsylvania, their ordering of parts and supplies 
from Cottman's Pennsylvania offices, and the fact that the 
franchisees "otherwise voluntarily accepted `long-term and 
exacting regulation' of their businesses by Cottman."  Id. at 843 
(citing Cottman License Agreement ¶ 7).   
 When Martino and Trans One failed to appear at a 
scheduled trial on the merits, defaults were entered against them 
on the claims set forth in Cottman's three-count complaint.  
After a hearing, the district court entered judgment on the 
Lanham Act count in the amount of $355,438 but declined to award 
damages on the counts that asserted breach of the A-1 contract 
and unfair competition, finding that an additional recovery would 
be "merely duplicative" of the relief already granted.  The court 
also awarded attorneys' fees under the Lanham Act and enjoined 
Martino and Trans One from using the Cottman or A-1 trademarks.  
 On appeal, Martino and Trans One challenge a number of 
district court rulings.  Because we find the venue question to be 
dispositive, we do not address the other alleged errors.  See 
LeRoy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979); Cameron 
v. Thornburgh, 983 F.2d 253, 257 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
 
 
 In ruling on Martino's challenges to venue, the 
district court overlooked the important distinction between the 
case at hand and Metro.  In that case, the suits were based on a 
breach of the Cottman franchise agreement, and its terms were 
critical.  The pertinent provision stated that "[w]ith respect to 
any legal proceedings arising out of [the Cottman] Agreement, 
[franchisee] and COTTMAN consent to the jurisdiction and venue of 
. . . the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania, and any legal proceedings arising out of [that] 
Agreement shall be brought only in such court[] . . . ."  Cottman 
License Agreement ¶ 27. 
 However, the present complaint against Martino does not 
arise under the Cottman franchise agreement, but under the A-1 
franchise agreement and the Lanham Act.  Any doubt on this point 
was removed when counsel for Cottman, in argument before the 
district court, stated:  "[O]ur claim against Mr. Martino, which 
is before you, does not include any claim under the Cottman 
license agreement."  Counsel explained his client's position to 
be that after the Cottman agreement was rescinded, Martino 
reverted to being a franchisee of A-1 Transmissions.  Having 
taken an assignment from A-1, Cottman contended that it therefore 
had the right to enforce the A-1 franchise agreement.  As counsel 
remarked, "We wish them to go back to the A-1 license."   
 Because the present suit does not arise under the 
Cottman franchise agreement, the choice of venue provision of 
 
 
that contract has no application, and we delete it from further 
consideration.  The A-1 franchise agreement does not contain a 
forum selection clause, and we therefore look to the record to 
determine whether, under the pertinent statutory provisions, 
venue was proper in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 
 I. 
 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2) provides that in diversity 
cases, suit may be brought in "a judicial district in which a 
substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the 
claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the 
subject of the action is situated."  In actions that are not 
founded solely on diversity, the venue requirements can be found 
in § 1391(b).  See, e.g., Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. 
Metropolitan Baltimore Football Club, Ltd., 1994 WL 423471, at *2 
(7th Cir. Aug. 12, 1994) (trademark infringement); Dakota Indus., 
Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 946 F.2d 1384, 1392 (8th Cir. 
1991) (same).  Section 1391(b)(2) repeats precisely the wording 
of section 1391(a)(2).  
 Section 1391 was amended in 1990 by the Judicial 
Improvements Act of 1990 in response to a recommendation of the 
Federal Courts Study Committee.  See Report of the Fed. Courts 
Study Comm. 94 (Comm. Print 1990).  The Report pointed out that 
the reference in the earlier version of section 1391(b) to the 
district "in which the claim arose" led to wasteful litigation 
whenever several different forums were involved in the 
 
 
transactions leading up to the dispute.  The House Report noted 
that the new language was in accord with that recommended earlier 
by an American Law Institute study.  See H.R. Rep. No. 734, 101st 
Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 
6869.   
 The amendment changed pre-existing law to the extent 
that the earlier version had encouraged an approach that a claim 
could generally arise in only one venue.  However, the current 
statutory language still favors the defendant in a venue dispute 
by requiring that the events or omissions supporting a claim be 
"substantial."  Events or omissions that might only have some 
tangential connection with the dispute in litigation are not 
enough.  Substantiality is intended to preserve the element of 
fairness so that a defendant is not haled into a remote district 
having no real relationship to the dispute. 
 The Federal Courts Study Committee's recommendation was 
based on the underlying aim of simplifying litigation rather than 
displacing the existing policy that showed due consideration for 
the defendant.  In that context, LeRoy v. Great W. United Corp., 
443 U.S. 173 (1979) still retains viability.  There, the Supreme 
Court explained:  "In most instances, the purpose of statutorily 
specified venue is to protect the defendant against the risk that 
a plaintiff will select an unfair or inconvenient place of 
trial."  Id. at 183-84 (footnote omitted).  Although LeRoy was 
decided before the 1990 amendment, it is interesting that in 
 
 
discussing venue, the Court weighed the "actions" taken in the 
District of Idaho before declaring the Northern District of Texas 
as an inappropriate situs for the litigation.  Id. at 185-86.   
 The test for determining venue is not the defendant's 
"contacts" with a particular district, but rather the location of 
those "events or omissions giving rise to the claim," 
theoretically a more easily demonstrable circumstance than where 
a "claim arose."  Although the statute no longer requires a court 
to select the "best" forum, Setco Enters. v. Robbins, 19 F.3d 
1278, 1281 (8th Cir. 1994), the weighing of "substantial" may at 
times seem to take on that flavor.   
 In Cameron, 983 F.2d at 257, a suit brought against 
federal prison officials, the Court observed that "[i]t seems 
abundantly clear that the `events and omissions' relevant to this 
case took place predominantly" at the prison where the plaintiff 
was incarcerated.  Consequently, that location was determined to 
be the proper venue for that case.  Similarly, in Bates v. C & S 
Adjusters, Inc., 980 F.2d 865, 868 (2d Cir. 1992), the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that the receipt of a 
challenged debt collection letter was "a substantial part of the 
events giving rise to a claim under the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act."  The Court pointed out that the Act is intended 
to prevent the type of injury that did not occur and would not 
occur until receipt of the letter.  Id.  Therefore, the place 
where the letter was received was a proper venue. 
 
 
 In Tefal, S.A. v. Products Int'l Co., 529 F.2d 495, 496  
n.1 (3d Cir. 1976), we concluded that under the pre-1990 venue 
statute, "a cause of action for trademark infringement arises 
where the passing off occurs."  See also Indianapolis Colts, 1994 
WL 423471, at *2 (citing 4 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on 
Trademarks and Intellectual Property § 32.22(3)(b)(iii) (3d ed. 
1994)); Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 
639 (2d Cir. 1956).  Under Tefal, if the infringement of a 
registered trademark occurred solely within one district, then 
only in that district would venue be proper.  By the same token, 
however, if the infringement occurred in other districts as well, 
then venue could be proper in more than one district.  Tefal, 529 
F.2d at 497.  The 1990 amendment to the venue statue did not 
necessarily shift the judicial focus away from the place of 
infringement for establishing proper venue in Lanham Act cases.   
 II. 
 With this background, we proceed to examine the nature 
of the suit brought by Cottman against Martino and Trans One.  
The breach of contract count is based on the contention that the 
A-1 franchise had been assigned to Cottman and was revived after 
the recision of Cottman's own franchise.  The A-1 agreement 
recites that it is deemed to have been made in Michigan and is to 
be construed in accordance with the law of that state.    
 Cottman also asserts that by operating a competing 
transmission facility under the name of "U.S.A. Transmissions" 
 
 
beginning in the spring of 1992, Martino violated the non-
competition clause of the A-1 agreement and engaged in unfair 
competition.  Martino allegedly failed to remove A-1 advertising, 
signs, business cards, and continued to use the Cottman telephone 
numbers listed in the Michigan Bell yellow pages.  The Lanham Act 
count is based on Martino's and Trans One's conduct after the 
spring of 1992 in their alleged unauthorized use of the Cottman 
and A-1 trademarks in connection with the operation of the U.S.A. 
Transmissions business in Michigan.   
 In asserting venue in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, the complaint alleges that Martino and Trans One 
have "participated in conduct in this district and [have] caused 
plaintiff to suffer injury in this district."  In its brief in 
this Court, Cottman asserts that there were three substantial 
acts and omissions that gave rise to its cause of action in the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, namely:  (1) Martino was 
obligated to pay license fees to Cottman in Pennsylvania, but 
failed to do so; (2) he failed to return A-1 advertising items to 
Cottman in Pennsylvania;1 and (3) Cottman prepared the Michigan 
Bell yellow page advertisements in Pennsylvania and from there 
caused them to be placed in the Michigan telephone directories.  
                     
1.  In its brief, Cottman also asserts that Martino was required 
by the Cottman franchise agreement to return trademarked items to 
it in Pennsylvania.  We will not consider this contention because 
it is contrary to plaintiff counsel's assertion in the district 




 In assessing whether events or omissions giving rise to 
the claims are substantial, it is necessary to look at the nature 
of the dispute.  The contract on which Cottman bases its state-
law claims was executed and performed in Michigan.  Martino's 
transmission repair center was located there.  The telephone 
directories were issued and used there.  Finally, the alleged 
unauthorized use of the trademarks at issue occurred in Michigan, 
not in Pennsylvania.  It is obvious that most, if not all, of the 
significant events occurred in Michigan.   
 The omissions that Cottman cites -- Martino's failure 
to return various materials and failure to remit payments -- 
actually occurred in Michigan, not in Pennsylvania.  Even though 
the result was Cottman's non-receipt of those items in 
Pennsylvania, the omissions bringing about this result actually 
occurred in Michigan.  Although this conclusion may seem to hinge 
on a question of "whether the glass is half full or half empty," 
we fail to see how these omissions could "give rise" to the 
claims that Cottman presents.   
 The sole event in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
of possible relevance to this case was Cottman's preparation of 
advertisements for the Michigan Bell yellow pages.  However, even 
this allegation is questionable because that work may have been 
performed solely in connection with the previously expired 
Cottman franchise, rather than that of A-1.   
 
 
 At any rate, as we held in Tefal, 529 F.2d at 496-97, 
the focus of our venue inquiry in a Lanham Act trademark 
infringement case is the location where the unauthorized passing 
off takes place -- whether that occurs solely within one district 
or in many.  See also Dakota Indus., 946 F.2d at 1388 (discussing 
without deciding the issue).  The district in which the infringed 
trademark was originally prepared or initiated is not 
determinative.  The record does not support an assertion that 
Martino attempted to pass off the trademarks at issue in the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania but, to the contrary, reveals 
that the alleged infringement occurred solely within the Eastern 
District of Michigan.   
 Cottman cannot rely on the fact that it prepared and 
placed the advertisements in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
as a basis for establishing venue in that district.  In short, 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and Tefal, venue in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania for Cottman's claim of trademark 
infringement has not been established.   
 The only events sufficiently substantial to give rise 
to Cottman's present causes of action occurred in the Eastern 
District of Michigan.  Therefore, as to Martino, the objections 
to improper venue should have been sustained and the case 
transferred to Michigan.  See Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 
463 (1962).    
 
 
 Martino's solely owned corporation, Trans One, stands 
on a somewhat different footing.  In LeRoy, 443 U.S. at 180, the 
Court emphasized that venue is a personal privilege of the 
defendant and may be waived.  See also Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 
12(h)(1).  As noted earlier, no attorney appeared for Trans One, 
and no objection to venue was filed on its behalf in the district 
court.  Hence, Trans One may be said to have waived its objection 
to venue.  However, the status of the judgment against it must be 
examined in light of the circumstances of this case.   
 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) provides that "[t]he district court 
of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong 
division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest 
of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in 
which it could have been brought."  Dismissal would not have been 
appropriate on the record here, and as to Martino, the proper 
procedure would have been to transfer.  Assuming that Trans One 
waived venue, the issue is whether the claims against it should 
also have been transferred along with the ones against Martino.   
 In the situation where venue is proper for one 
defendant but not for another and dismissal is inappropriate, the 
district court has a choice.  One option is to transfer the 
entire case to another district that is proper for both 
defendants.  Another alternative is to sever the claims, 
retaining jurisdiction over one defendant and transferring the 
case as to the other defendant to an appropriate district.  See 
 
 
In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 819 (3d Cir. 
1982); 15 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & 
Procedure § 3827, at 275-76 (1986 & Supp. 1994). 
 In Sunbelt Corp. v. Noble, Denton & Assocs., Inc., 5 
F.3d 28 (3d Cir. 1993), we adopted the position "that [the court] 
should not sever if the defendant over whom jurisdiction is 
retained is so involved in the controversy to be transferred that 
partial transfer would require the same issues to be litigated in 
two places."  Id. at 33-34. (internal quotation omitted).  When 
the conduct of a co-defendant as to whom venue is proper is 
central to the issues raised by the plaintiff against those 
subject to transfer, the grant of a severance would not 
ordinarily be consistent with the sound exercise of discretion.  
See id. at 34.    
 The facts in this case leave no room for doubt that 
Trans One, owned solely by Martino, is directly connected to the 
main issues, and accordingly, severance by the district court 
would not have been proper.  We conclude, therefore, that the 
proper procedure in this case would have been to transfer the 
case in its entirety to the Eastern District of Michigan. 
 The final question to be addressed is the appropriate 
remedy in this case.  We have indicated that only in rare 
instances will we invoke mandamus jurisdiction to review a 
transfer order.  See Carteret Sav. Bank, FA v. Shushan, 919 F.2d 
225, 232-33 (3d Cir. 1990).  It is therefore unlikely that an 
 
 
erroneous ruling on improper venue will be examined by this Court 
except on appeal.  Even so, one Court has held that it would not 
reverse on the ground of improper venue after a judgment was 
entered on the merits, absent a showing of prejudice as a result 
of the erroneous ruling.  See Whittier v. Emmet, 281 F.2d 24, 30-
31 (D.C. Cir. 1960).  The controlling factors in that case, 
however, were somewhat unique; the defendant was the United 
States government, and the dispute centered on a provision of a 
life insurance policy issued by the government.  In those 
circumstances, venue was really only of academic interest.  In 
Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Clark, 725 F.2d 1434 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984), reh'g en banc granted and vacated without op., No. 
83-1224, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Apr. 23, 1984), and appeal dismissed 
per stipulation, No. 83-1224, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Nov. 6, 1984), 
the same Court found the Whittier reasoning not applicable in 
other circumstances.  
 In contrast, the Supreme Court in Olberding v. Illinois 
Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338 (1953), reversed a plaintiff's judgment 
because of improper venue even though the case had been tried to 
a jury.  Justice Frankfurter characterized the venue issue as "a 
horse soon curried" and apparently had no difficulty with having 
a retrial.  Id. at 340.  In Gogolin & Stelter v. Karn's Auto 
Imports, Inc., 886 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1989) and United States ex 
rel. Harvey Gulf Int'l Marine Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 573 
F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1978), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
 
 
Circuit held that a judgment on the merits would be reversed or 
vacated and the cases remanded for transfer or dismissal if it is 
determined on appeal that venue was improper in the district 
court.  See also Bechtel v. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 534 F.2d 1335 
(9th Cir. 1976); Lied Motor Car Co. v. Maxey, 208 F.2d 672 (8th 
Cir. 1953); cf. Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Robertson, 372 U.S. 591 
(1963) (per curiam).    
 In this case, we cannot overlook the fact that Martino 
proceeded pro se, no counsel was engaged to represent Trans One, 
the judgments were obtained by default, defendants were not 
present during the hearing on damages, and a review of the record 
reveals that both Martino and Trans One have colorable defenses 
on liability and damages.  These circumstances persuade us that 
proceeding with the case in an improper forum had a substantially 
detrimental effect on defendants.  In these circumstances, we 
conclude that the interest of justice will best be served by 
vacating the judgment of the district court and transferring the 
entire case to the Eastern District of Michigan. 
 We have authority to transfer the case without imposing 
that task on the district court.  See, e.g., Minnette v. Time 
Warner, 997 F.2d 1023, 1026-27 (2d Cir. 1993); Cameron, 983 F.2d 
at 257; Cox Enters. v. Holt, 691 F.2d 989, 990 (11th Cir. 1982) 
(per curiam); Dr. John T. MacDonald Found., Inc. v. Califano, 571 
F.2d 328, 332 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).   
 
 
 Accordingly, the judgments of the district court will 
be vacated, and the case will be transferred to the Eastern 
District of Michigan. 
___________________________________ 
      
